How Deep is ?Deep Democracy?? Grassroots globalization from Mumbai to Cape Town by Robins, Steven
143
7 ·  How deep is ‘deep democracy’? Grassroots 
globalization from Mumbai to Cape Town1
S T E V E N  R O B I N S
[Deep democracy] constitutes an effort to institute what we may call 
‘democracy without borders’, after the analogy of international class 
solidarity as conceived by the visionaries of world socialism in its hey-
day. This effort is what I seek to theorize in terms of deep democracy. 
(Appadurai, 2002: 45) 
As the tasks of the state have become more complex and the size of 
polities larger and more heterogeneous, the institutional forms of lib-
eral democracy developed in the nineteenth century – representative 
democracy plus techno-bureaucratic administration – seem increasingly 
ill-suited to the novel problems we face in the twenty-first century… In-
creasingly, this mechanism of political representation seems ineffective 
in accomplishing the central ideals of democratic politics: facilitating 
active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consen-
sus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that 
ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical 
egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens 
benefit from the nation’s wealth. (Fung and Wright, 2001: 1)
Introduction: the limits of liberal democracy
Notwithstanding the triumphal post-Cold War celebration of the 
world-wide spread of liberal democracy, pervasive voter apathy and 
citizen cynicism continue to be identified as symptoms of the funda-
mental flaws in the representative and procedural democracies of the 
West and beyond. In response to this bleak prognosis, governments 
and donors have shown considerable interest, over the last two decades, 
in programmes aimed at strengthening ‘civil society’ and at creating 
‘ active citizenship’, especially as they facilitate transitions to democracy. 
In the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, as well as of various popular struggles against apartheid, 
dictatorships and military regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
the idea of ‘civil society’ has taken on a particularly potent significance 
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in the popular imagination, as well as in donor-driven democracy pro-
grammes (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999). However, celebrations of ‘civil 
society’ and transitions to democracy have, in recent years, given way 
to cynical assessments and to the circulation of new terms, such as 
‘low intensity democracy’ (Gills et al., 1992) and ‘democracy lite’ (Paley, 
2002). Notwithstanding this widespread disenchantment with these thin 
versions of democracy, the idea of civil society continues to be equated 
with democratic renewal. This, in turn, has spurred the proliferation of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 
Most studies of democratic renewal have been interested in questions 
of procedural democracy and issues relating to formal political institu-
tions, regime transitions, elections and party politics. For instance, low 
voter turnout in the United States and Europe has spurred numerous 
studies and democracy programmes concerned with the role of social 
capital (Putnam, 1993a), citizen participation, NGOs and voluntary or-
ganizations, all of which were viewed as antidotes to these ‘democratic 
deficits’ (Luckham et al., 2003). Among many critics who bemoan the 
limits of procedural democracy, the existence of civil society organiza-
tions is perceived as a panacea, promoting ‘active citizenship’ in the face 
of growing voter and civic apathy. For similar reasons, projects aimed 
at ‘deepening democracy’ have attracted much attention and debate in 
academic, donor, activist and NGO circles. 
However, the notion of ‘deepening democracy’ (in the same way as 
concepts such as empowerment, civil society, participation and citizen-
ship) can mean virtually anything – and yet also, simultaneously, nothing 
special. In other words, although the polyvalent character of such key-
words may be rhetorically productive, they are often analytically weak. 
It is for this very reason that the purpose of this chapter is to ground 
the discussion of deep democracy in an analysis of the specific ways in 
which a South African social movement has attempted to give concrete 
content to abstract ideas about democratic rights and citizenship. In 
particular, we will investigate how a globally connected organization that 
claims to be ‘deepening democracy’ and working across national borders 
can end up becoming very parochial and strengthening patron–client 
relations. In other words, whatever the ‘cosmopolitan’ orientation of the 
organization’s ideology, its actual practice was fundamentally shaped 
by local struggles over access to resources.
The discussion here will focus, particularly, on a globally connected 
social movement – the South African Homeless People’s Federation 
(SAHPF). The SAHPF is a women’s organization of the urban poor that 
is involved in a wide range of activities, including savings clubs, housing 
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and land issues, income-generation projects, community policing and 
AIDS intervention. In the course of its struggles for access to housing 
for poor people in South Africa, it has been able to develop both vertical 
(local/national) and horizontal (transnational/global) networks, alliances 
and coalitions. Before discussing the actual ideas and practices of the 
SAHPF, however, it is necessary to provide some background to the 
political and economic context within which this organization operates.
A brief sketch of the post-apartheid political and economic 
landscape
South Africa is a relatively wealthy emerging economy, characterized by 
extreme forms of socio-economic inequality comparable to that found in 
countries such as Brazil. Following the first democratic elections in 1994, 
the African National Congress (ANC) government opted for what has been 
described as a standard package of neoliberal macro-economic policies. 
Leftist critics (Marais, 1998; Alexander, 2002; Bond, 2000; Terre blanche, 
2002) have argued that these neoliberal policies have been responsible 
for growth in unemployment, major cutbacks in government social ex-
penditure, cost-recovery measures, the privatization of essential services 
such as water, electricity and transport, and the disconnection of essential 
services for those in arrears. From this perspective, the ANC government 
certainly has capitulated to the neoliberal agenda. 
Despite divergent explanations for why and how this has happened, 
there is consensus among these critics that the policies and privatiza-
tion initiatives under the ANC’s Growth, Equity and Reconstruction 
programme have failed to redress (in any significant way) the forms of 
racialized poverty and inequality inherited from the apartheid era. In 
fact, current macro-economic policies have been perceived as exacer-
bating inequalities that have their roots in colonial and apartheid 
history. This failure to improve the conditions of the bottom 50 per 
cent of the population has occurred despite the government’s claims 
to have achieved moderate rates of inflation, a growing economy, and 
state provision of housing, clean water, electricity and thousands of 
new classrooms and clinics. This is by no means a ‘conventional’ neo-
liberal state: the government has also established massive social grant 
programmes, has a well-funded and reasonably well-functioning public 
health system, and has provided over 1.5 million housing subsidies to 
its poorest citizens. Despite the benefits of a progressive constitution 
and some improvements in the delivery of services to the poor, South 
Africa continues to have massive unemployment and one of the most 
unequal income distribution curves in the world. 
